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Disentangling Referendums and Direct Democracy: A Defence of the 
Systemic Approach to Popular Vote Processes
What is the relationship between referendum and initiative processes and 
democracy? The dominant understanding is that these popular vote processes are 
institutions associated with a model of direct democracy that stands in opposition 
to representative democracy. However, this pervasive approach is rarely justified 
and appears to limit the study of popular vote processes by focusing on 
implausible ideals, obscuring that many democratic institutions face similar 
challenges, and encouraging overgeneralizing claims that neglect institutional 
variation in referendum and initiative processes. Previous criticisms of the 
association of popular vote processes with direct democracy have failed to clearly 
articulate an alternativ . We trace the emergence of a democratic systems 
approach to popular vote processes and argue that it provides a better conceptual 
framework to empirically study and normatively discuss these processes.
Keywords: democratic systems, initiatives, political processes, referendums, 
representative democracy.
Introduction
Popular vote processes1 – a term that we use to refer to a variety of referendum and 
initiatives processes that allow citizens to vote on policy issues – have been used to 
make many major political decisions in recent years, ranging from issues such as 
marriage equality in Ireland, peace agreement in Colombia, political institutions in Italy, 
and European Union membership in Great Britain. This ‘referendumania’ (The 
1 We refrain from using the broadly adopted terms of ‘referendums’ and ‘direct democratic 
mechanisms’ to designate all the processes leading to a popular vote on issues, and follow 
Cheneval and el-Wakil (2018b) in using the term ‘popular vote processes’. While they only 
introduce and use the concept, we provide a defense of this term in the conclusion of the 
paper.



































































Economist 2016) has prompted renewed public and academic debates about the 
appropriateness and democratic legitimacy of including referendums and initiatives 
alongside representative institutions in democratic systems. Indeed, the ‘value [of 
popular vote processes] in terms of democratic principles still needs to be established’ 
(Weale 2007, 105; see also e.g., Saward 2000, 5; Held 2006, 284; Chambers 2009, 331; 
Garrigou 2016).
Most existing assessments of popular vote processes take these institutions to be 
‘direct democratic’ devices that fundamentally differ from institutions of representative 
democracy (see e.g., Saward 1993; Budge 1996; Buchanan 2001; Held 2006; Leib 
2006; Gastil and Richards 2013; Offe 2017; Neblo, Esterling, and Lazer 2018). On this 
view, popular vote processes are evaluated in terms of their capacity to promote the 
realization of a specific model of democracy: direct democracy. Direct democracy is 
usually understood to stand in opposition to a model of representative democracy, 
suggesting that there is an inherent tension between popular vote processes and 
representative institutions. We refer to this way of framing the relationship between 
popular vote processes and democracy as the ‘direct democracy approach’ (DDA). Its 
key tenets have been criticized as ‘outdated’ (Budge 2006, 2) or caricatural (Tierney 
2012, 14). Critics allege that the DDA has led scholars to focus on irrelevant questions 
(Hug 2009; Grynaviski 2015, 238) and limited our understanding of popular vote 
processes (Saward 2001). 
Despite these criticisms, the DDA remains widely influential in both empirical 
and theoretical research, and surprisingly little work has been done to outline an 
alternative. Yet the foundations of an alternative approach can be found in a long 
dormant but now resurgent line of inquiry that seeks to understand how popular vote 
processes are integrated with other institutions in democratic systems and how these 



































































interactions contribute to, or undermine, the realization of democratic ideals (see e.g., 
Setälä 2006, 2011; Parkinson 2009; Leemann 2015; Prato and Strulovici 2017; 
Cheneval and el‐Wakil 2018a; McKay 2019). To date, however, there has been no 
explicit articulation of the underlying normative and conceptual presuppositions of this 
new approach, which we call the democratic systems approach (DSA). 
This article has two complementary goals. First, to reconstruct the often implicit 
and unargued assumptions that are at the heart of existing approaches to popular vote 
processes. In sections 1 and 2, we draw on prominent illustrations of the DDA and 
DSA, respectively, in order to highlight the shared underlying premises that inform 
discussions of popular vote processes. Because these two approaches are often seen as 
simply part of the existing conceptual terrain, the authors of the examples that we 
provide may not see themselves as using the DDA or DSA. Nonetheless, our goal is to 
make these paradigms explicit in the hope of encouraging active reflection and 
evaluation of their suitability for approaching and judging popular vote processes.
Our second goal is to assess whether the DSA is a viable alternative that can 
avoid some of the DDA’s shortcomings. In section 3, we draw on constructivist theories 
of representation to develop a critique of the DDA that is more fundamental than 
previous efforts. We then outline two problems that result from using the DDA – a 
neglect for shared solutions to democratic challenges and overgeneralisations about 
popular vote processes – and illustrate how they affect research with examples from the 
literature on citizen competence and minority oppression. We argue that the DSA 
avoids these problems and thus provides a productive alternative for both political 
theorists and empirical political scientists that opens a new research agenda on popular 
vote processes. We conclude by giving practical advice to minimize the pervasive 
influence of the DDA and implement the DSA.




































































1. The Direct Democracy Approach to Popular Vote Processes
Democratic theorists and empirical political scientists generally discuss initiative and 
referendum devices as mechanisms of direct democracy.2 Characterizing popular vote 
processes in this way suggests that these devices are being evaluated through the lens of 
the DDA. In this section, we reconstruct this approach and its underlying framework, 
which have impacted thinking about popular vote processes by both opponents to and 
proponents of these processes. The DDA entails, at its core, the widely held belief in a 
conflict between direct and representative models of democracy. While there is 
considerable variation in how, precisely, different theorists present this conflict, the 
primary point of contention is whether the presence of representation is beneficial or 
detrimental to democracy. The DDA’s association of popular vote processes with direct 
democracy thus suggests that they are devices that stand in opposition to representation. 
While key aspects of the DDA have been criticized as unrealistic, we demonstrate that 
most attempts at addressing these problems have only led to modifications of the DDA, 
not to its rejection.
‘Direct democracy’ has been defined in numerous ways. Some take it to 
designate models of democracy in which elected representatives act as delegates and 
closely follow the will of their constituents (Fishkin 1995) or in which the governing 
authorities are randomly selected (Manin 1997). These understandings however remain 
marginal compared to the widely shared conception of direct democracy that underlies 
2 The category of direct democratic mechanisms encompasses more than popular votes, 
typically including other practices such as face-to-face assemblies or recall elections, and 
political systems that include some or all of these institutions are often called ‘direct 
democracies’ (see e.g., Budge 1996, 2; Saward 1998, 83; Kriesi 2005b).



































































the DDA, namely a model of democracy in which assemblies open to all citizens make 
all the political decisions by vote in the absence of representation (see e.g., Miller 1978, 
3; Cohen 1986; Sartori 1987; Dahl 1989; Urbinati 2006; Rosanvallon 2011a, 123; 
Papadopoulos 2012, 126; Dupuis-Déri 2016; Kioupkiolis 2017; Lacey 2017, 36–37; 
Goodin and Spiekermann 2018, 244). 
This model of direct democracy contains two institutional features, namely 
open-ended, large scale, and face-to-face legislative assemblies in which all eligible 
citizens can participate and majoritarian popular votes to make decisions on legislation. 
Yet these institutional arrangements are only valuable to the extent that they enable the 
realisation of the third feature, the absence of representation, which serves as the 
normative core of the direct democracy model. The absence of representation does not 
merely point toward a political system without institutions of representative 
government, such as elected legislatures, but suggests that political participation ought 
to be entirely unmediated by representation (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001). As Hug 
(2009, 252, fn 5; see also Altman 2011, 7, fn 11; Urbinati 2006, 113) puts it, ‘the term 
direct democracy in its original sense […] [is] the opposite of representative democracy. 
Consequently, in a direct democracy representative institutions do not exist’. For Sartori 
(1987, 111), direct democracy is ‘a democracy without representatives and without 
representational transmission belts’. The model of direct democracy is thus 
fundamentally relational in that it is defined by its comparative absence of 
representation – and, thus, by its dichotomous opposition to a model of representative 
democracy.3 In other terms, ‘representative democracy’ is ‘indirect’ while ‘direct 
3 The term itself only started to be used in the first quarter of the 20th century in English, French 
and German, according to Schorderet (2005, 8), perhaps in response to a growing distinction 
between representative government and what was previously referred to as ‘democracy’ or 
‘pure democracy’ (Hindess 2000).



































































democracy’ is ‘direct’ by virtue of the absence of representation (see e.g., Butler and 
Ranney 1994, 12–13; Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 30–31; Weale 2007, 31)
How does this model of direct democracy relate to the study of popular vote 
processes? It represents the conceptual and normative framework against which these 
processes are evaluated and studied. Broadly, we conceive of the DDA as an approach 
to the study of popular vote processes that (1) accepts the absence of representation as 
the normative core of direct democracy, taken as a model irreconcilable with 
representative democracy and (2) conceives of popular vote processes as direct 
institutions opposed to representative ones. 
We can distinguish between strong and weak versions of the DDA depending on 
the extent to which popular vote processes are identified with the model of direct 
democracy. The strong DDA subsumes discussions about popular vote processes in 
debates about direct versus representativ  democracy (see e.g., Gutmann and Thompson 
2004, 30–31; Held 2006, 4; Goodin and Spiekermann 2018, 244). In other words, the 
practice and institutional design of popular vote processes are ignored because these 
questions are seen as secondary in comparison to questions about which democratic 
ideal is preferable. Debates thus focus on comparing direct and representative 
democracy, and the result of these comparisons are taken to say something about 
popular vote processes: proponents of direct democracy broadly approve of all direct 
democratic mechanisms attached (see e.g., Saward 1993; Budge 1996; Chollet 2011), 
while those who favour representative democracy broadly reject them (see e.g., Cohen 
1997; Urbinati 2006; Weale 2007). 
A number of scholars, primarily in empirical research, have contended that the 
strong DDA is unrealistic. They insist that, in practice, direct democratic mechanisms 
exist within democratic systems that also include representative institutions. Their 



































































proposed solution is to acknowledge that ‘direct democracy is […] mediated by political 
organisations and their representatives’ (Kriesi 2005a, 7) and to call initiative and 
referendum processes ‘semidirect’ for they entail ‘institutional intermediation’ (Altman 
2011, 7, fn11). As such, instead of disentangling popular vote processes from direct 
democracy, they propose adopting what we refer to as the weak DDA. The weak DDA 
highlights the tension between practice and the theoretical model of direct democracy, 
but retains this model as the regulative ideal to which these processes should aspire. 
Popular vote processes are thus still conceived as fundamentally opposed to 
representative institutions. This can be seen, for instance, in Neblo, Esterling and 
Lazer’s (2018, 9) claim that ‘direct democratic reformers seek to make representative 
democracy less representative’, which implies a trade-off between direct participation 
and representation. Similarly, Offe (2017, 18) suggests that the ‘plebiscitarian methods’ 
of Brexit ‘came at the price of undermining the authority of Parliament’.
In both its weak and strong variants, the DDA’s emphasis on the conflict 
between ‘direct’ and ‘representative’ models of democracy permeates evaluations of 
popular vote processes by both critics and advocates. As Hug (2009, 253) puts it, ‘much 
of the continuing debate on referendums focuses on opposing representative democracy 
to referendums’. In normative discussions, the value of direct democracy and its devices 
has been argued to reside in the fact that they enable citizens to ‘directly’ decide on 
issues, which is ‘more democratic than representative democracy’ (Saward 1998, 83–
84; see also Butler and Ranney 1994, 15; Budge 2006, 1–2). This claim mainly relies on 
the ‘intuitive’ (Lagerspetz 2016, 128; Tierney 2012, 19) argument that direct democracy 
restores ‘the absolute sovereignty of the people’ (Bourne 1912, 3-5, as cited in Achen 
and Bartels 2016, 51) and realises the essence of democracy (Bogdanor 1981, 93), the 
freedom for citizens to govern themselves without transferring their decision-making 



































































rights to others (Chollet 2011). Supporters of representative democracy have replied 
that direct democratic regimes produce epistemically suboptimal (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, 31; Goodin and Spiekermann 2018, 251–54) or simply undesirable, 
tyrannical, unrealistic or inconsistent political outcomes due to the unmediated character 
of decision-making and the limited competence of citizens (see e.g., Burke 1790, 103; 
Rosanvallon 2011, 132; Offe 2017). Representative democracy, by avoiding these 
pitfalls, provides in their view a preferable democratic ideal (Plotke 1997; Mansbridge 
2003; Urbinati 2006). In empirical studies, research on popular vote processes has 
largely focused on better understanding whether ordinary citizens can learn and make 
informed decisions (see e.g., Lupia 1994; Kriesi 2005a; Colombo 2018), whether these 
processes harm minorities (see e.g., Hajnal, Gerber, and Louch 2002; Marxer 2012; 
Christmann 2013), or whether the influence of interest groups can manipulate the ‘will 
of the people’ (see e.g., Gerber 1999; Matsusaka 2004; Boehmke 2005).
While there are many critiques of the model of direct democracy, largely from 
the perspective of representative democracy, explicit critiques of the DDA itself, as an 
approach to popular vote processes, are rare. Indeed, contestations of the ideal of direct 
democracy promoted in the DDA do not amount to criticizing the relevance of direct 
democracy for the study of popular vote processes. It is tempting to see Budge’s (1996, 
84) call to examine the ‘actual functioning of referendums and initiatives’ rather than 
trying to resolve disputes between direct and representative democracy as an early 
critique of the DDA. However, his criticism of direct democracy seeks to redefine the 
concept to include mediation by political parties, rather than focusing on an absence of 
representation, and to see direct and representative democracy as ‘two ends of a 
continuum rather than a sharply opposed dichotomy’ (1996, 175, 181); as such, he 
preserves an opposition between the two models that suggests unavoidable trade-offs –



































































and a conception of popular vote processes as direct democratic mechanisms (1996, 
85).4 Ultimately, Budge diagnoses potent shortcomings of the DDA but his theorized 
alternative is simply one version of the weak DDA. 
Still, some authors have called for disentangling debates about popular vote 
processes from debates about direct versus representative democracy. Mendelsohn and 
Parkin explicitly open their book with the hope of opening up ‘a path whereby research 
on the referendum is no longer structured around a debate between the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of two opposing systems of democracy: representative 
and direct’ (2001, 1). Their account remains relatively brief and does not fully justify 
the choice to adopt this approach rather than the prevailing DDA. In the next section we 
flesh out an alternative approach to the DDA – the democratic systems approach (DSA) 
– while the following section argues that the DSA should replace the DDA as the 
dominant way of conceiving the relationship between popular vote processes and 
democracy.
2. The Democratic Systems Approach to Popular Vote Processes
Although its explicit characterization as a unified approach is lacking, we 
suggest that a more systemic approach to popular vote processes has developed in 
parallel to the DDA.5 This approach has several notable precursors (see e.g., Condorcet 
1793; Dicey 1911) but appears to be enjoying a resurgence in both political science and 
political theory6 (see e.g., Setälä 2006; Parkinson 2009; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 
4 For other attempts to redefine direct democracy and keep it opposed to representative 
democracy, see e.g., Fishkin 1995; Manin 1997; Urbinati 2000.
5 Partial developments of the approach’s underlying theory can however be found in Hug 
(2009), Bellamy (2018), and Cheneval and el-Wakil (2018b).
6 Warren (2017, 41) contends that the systems approach to democratic theory is not new, but a 
‘rediscovery’. We suggest that this is true of the systemic approach to popular vote processes 
too.



































































2010; Peters 2016; Leemann and Wasserfallen 2016; Prato and Strulovici 2017; 
Cheneval and el‐Wakil 2018a; Le Bihan 2018; McKay 2019).7 This evolution coincides 
with a broader systemic turn in democratic theory (Mansbridge et al. 2012; Owen and 
Smith 2015; Warren 2017), which we draw upon to reconstruct the core features of the 
DSA to popular vote processes. We identify two main features of the DSA: (1) it 
evaluates popular vote processes according to their capacity to further general 
democratic values and (2) it is attentive to how these processes are implemented in 
practice and how they interact with other political processes in democratic systems, 
including representative ones. 
Precursors to the contemporary DSA for instance defended popular vote 
processes as tools for citizens to incentivise responsiveness from their representatives 
and secure against misrule (McCormick 2001; Elster 2013; Bruno 2017). A.V. Dicey 
argued that the referendum could give citizens veto power, allowing them to block ‘the 
passing of any important Act which does not command the sanction of the electors’ 
(1911, cix). Similarly, early 20th century supporters of popular votes in Oregon did not 
want to ‘destroy representative government’ but wanted to keep the initiative and 
referendum ‘for emergency use’ (Ford 1912, 70, cited in Achen and Bartels 2016, 69). 
More recent versions of the DSA can be found in research that investigates how popular 
vote processes are integrated in democratic systems. They have theoretically and 
empirically researched these processes’ potential to focus public deliberation on specific 
issues (Setälä 2006, 703; Lacey 2017, 192–94), encourage political authorities to be 
more responsive to voters (Graham Smith 2009, 119; Vatter 2009; Saward 1998, 83), 
7 The use of this alternative approach is not necessary reflected in the terminology, as 
contributions to this approach sometimes preserve the language of ‘direct democratic 
mechanisms’. However, and while this exemplifies the lack of explicit reflection about how 
to approach popular vote processes, the contributions mentioned here disentangle popular 
vote processes from the normative model of direct democracy.



































































improve turnout in elections (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010; Peters 2016), and 
increase the legitimacy and stability of strongly binding decisions (Chambers 2001; 
Parkinson 2009). 
What distinguishes the DSA most clearly from the DDA is that it abandons the 
models-thinking that has shaped much research about popular vote processes. The 
recent systemic turn in democratic theory criticizes models for reducing democracy to 
one specific practice and ‘over-simplify[ing] the complexity of democratic practice’ 
(Owen and Smith 2015, 231).8 The systems approach recognises that democracy 
requires a division of labour because different practices – disentangled from specific 
models – are particularly well-suited to addressing different types of democratic 
problems (Saward 2003; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012; Warren 2017). The DSA, 
too, tends to reinstate democracy without adjectives – rather than direct democracy – as 
the highest-level normative ideal and to acknowledge that it might be realized by the 
complementary presence of various practices, including both voting and representation. 
These various practices are combined both within and across institutions in order to 
fulfil a number of functions common to democracy in general, such as the three key 
normative functions defined by Warren (2017, 43–45), namely empowered inclusion, 
collective agenda and will formation, and collective decision making.
The DSA presupposes that popular vote processes are better understood as part 
of a broader democratic system and that the nature of other related institutions and 
differences in the designs of popular vote processes interact in complex ways. Gordon 
Smith’s (1976, 8) analysis of how popular vote processes interact with other democratic 
8 For instance, theories of deliberative democracy tend to reduce democracy to deliberation; 
minimalist theories of democracy tend to reduce democracy to elections; and direct 
democracy tends to reduce democracy to a system devoid of representation.



































































institutions, such as political parties, and evaluation of them on their ‘supportive 
capacity towards the system’ over time is an example of this feature of the DSA.  
Setälä’s (2006) assessment of different referendum processes’ capacity to enhance the 
accountability of elected representatives similarly attends to the design of both popular 
vote processes and other institutions. While the practice of distinguishing ‘between 
various types of referendums, their design and use’ (Hollander 2019, 28) is not new, the 
DSA explicitly pursues a more holistic view of how these institutional differences are 
integrated with other institutions in pursuit of democratic outcomes (Setälä 2006; 
Altman 2018; Hollander 2019). 
3. The Two Approaches Compared
Which approach to popular vote processes should be favoured? In what follows, 
we argue that the DDA has three fundamental limitations and that it should be 
abandoned. We examine how the core features of the DSA lay the basis to address these 
limitations.  
3a. The Implausible Core of Direct Democracy
The strong version of the DDA emphasizes the absence of representation in 
ways that are generally considered, by both critics and advocates of popular vote 
processes, to be unrealistic for contemporary democracies. Despite widespread 
agreement that a complete absence of representation is unfeasible in large-scale, modern 
societies (see e.g., Plotke 1997, 25–26; Cohen 2009, 34; Lacey 2017, 37–38), the weak 
DDA maintains the absence of representation as a regulative ideal. We suggest here that 
recent constructivist theories of representation, which view representation as a practice 
of claim-making that is not reducible to electoral politics (see e.g., Saward 2006; 



































































Montanaro 2012; Kuyper 2016), highlight that representation is not merely practically 
unavoidable, but is conceptually inseparable from democracy. If this is the case, it 
suggests that the DSA has an advantage, for its willingness to abandon models of 
democracy does away with the DDA’s fixation on the absence of representation in 
favour of focusing on how various practices, such as representing, can contribute to 
democracy.
Saward (2006, 302) describes representation as a process in which ‘would-be 
political representatives […] make claims about themselves and their constituents and 
the links between the two’. Without going so far as to argue that ‘representation is 
democracy’ (Plotke 1997), we note that there is agreement that these claims are 
virtually inescapable in democratic politics, as they are necessary to shape interests, 
create and mobilise constituencies, and set the agenda (Mansbridge 2003; Disch 2011). 
This makes it possible to theorise various forms of non-electoral representation, which 
‘is a pervasive and persistent phenomenon’ (Kuyper 2016, 310), and which operates, as 
Saward (2006, 316) notes in passing, ‘in regimes of “direct democracy” no less than in 
regimes of “representative democracy”’. That is, even if elected representatives do not 
play prominent roles in popular vote processes, representation of some kind seems to 
remain unavoidable. 
This insight suggests that the core feature of direct democracy, namely the 
absence of representation, is untenable. As a result, the crux of the disagreement 
between representative and direct models of democracy – the idea of democracy 
without representation – is shown to be fundamentally misguided. This does not mean 
simply that representative democracy has triumphed over direct democracy. In fact, 
Landemore (2017, 57–58) argues that the inability to avoid representation in democratic 
politics provides one of several reasons to ‘move entirely past and beyond 



































































“representative democracy”’ as a model of democracy. While these models have 
usefully emphasized the importance of particular practices for democracy, we suggest 
that the DDA’s models-thinking is now more of a liability than an asset. The question 
should no longer be whether we should have representation or direct participation, but 
how, where, when, and why we should institutionalize particular practices. The DDA is 
not well-suited to answering these questions. Instead, it prevents productive 
comparisons between, for instance, elections and popular vote processes and encourages 
overly broad conclusions about popular vote processes based on particular examples or 
subtypes.
3b. ‘Direct Democratic Mechanisms’ and the Problems of Generalisation
Theorising about popular vote processes as ‘direct democratic mechanisms’ within the 
framework of a debate between models of direct and representative democracy can lead 
– and has led – to two more specific kinds of problems. The first problem is that the 
DDA makes it difficult to conceive of how different models might face similar 
problems or establish common solutions. In this sense, it leads to under-generalising the 
scope of specific democratic problems. The second problem is that the DDA’s tendency 
to think in terms of models is that findings about particular institutions are often 
overgeneralized as findings about a particular model. We illustrate these two problems 
with examples from two prominent topics in popular vote process research. The first 
topic is the question of whether citizens are competent to make decisions through 
popular vote processes (see e.g., Fabbrini 2001; Weale 2007; Topaloff 2017). The 
second topic is the question of whether popular vote processes allow minorities to be 
oppressed in a way that is unlikely in representative governments (see e.g., Mendelsohn 
and Parkin 2001, 17; Graham Smith 2009, 118; Bellamy 2018).



































































The first problem of the DDA visible in these two topics is that it minimizes the 
extent to which representative institutions face these problems too: representative 
governments also violate the rights of minorities (Matsusaka 2005, 168), and that voters 
are incompetent could be said of voters in elections for representative governments 
(Grynaviski 2015; Achen and Bartels 2016). The DDA also pushes researchers to 
neglect how solutions associated with representation might actually address criticisms 
of popular vote processes. For instance, just as elected representatives are commonly 
seen to compensate for deficiencies in citizen competence by being more reflective, 
compromise-driven, and informed (Mansbridge 2003, 515; Urbinati 2006; Bellamy 
2018), forms of representation embedded in popular vote processes might mitigate the 
lack of information or incompetence of voters in popular votes (Lupia 1994; Kriesi 
2005a). As such, the DDA’s emphasis on conflicts between direct and representative 
models of democracy perpetuates an artificial divide between ‘problems of direct 
democratic processes’ and ‘problems of representative processes’. It supports a double 
standard instead of encouraging researchers to acknowledge that these problems are 
actually challenges to democracy writ large. In contrast, the DSA encourages 
researchers to compare how different institutions fare with regards to the same 
objections and with the same theoretical framework, and how each might be redesigned 
to address common problems of democracy.
The second problem of the DDA illustrated by research on the two topics 
mentioned is that of overgeneralisation. Allegations of citizen incompetence and 
minority oppression are used to dismiss all popular vote processes, independently of 
their institutional differences. To be sure, the literature usually distinguishes four main 
institutional popular vote designs – mandatory referendums, top-down referendums, 
facultative referendums, and popular initiatives (Altman 2011, 11; Setälä 2006, 705–7) 



































































– that can be implemented in various ways (el-Wakil and Cheneval 2018). From this 
perspective, the involvement of representatives, which in turn varies depending on 
whether popular votes are triggered in a bottom-up or top-down way and on specific 
campaign regulations, has been shown to impact voters’ levels of knowledge on issues 
put to popular votes (see e.g., Sciarini and Trechsel 1996; Reidy and Suiter 2015; 
Goldberg, Lanz, and Sciarini 2019). And while empirical evidence does suggest that 
minority oppression is more common in jurisdictions that allow for popular initiatives 
(Dyck 2016; Lewis 2013),9 other popular vote processes might actually empower 
minorities (Chambers 2018; Cheneval and el-Wakil 2018). The DDA’s framing of these 
processes as ‘non-representative’, as a homogeneous category of ‘direct democratic 
processes’ that can all be rejected or promoted at once, obscures these differences. 
This faulty conceptualisation of popular vote processes causes problems in 
empirical research on the use of popular vote processes. For instance, much of the 
literature on process preferences follows Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s distinction 
between ‘direct democrats’ and ‘institutional democrats’ despite the fact that their 
process scale provides few specifics about institutions (2001; see also e.g., Allen and 
Birch 2015). The literature on popular support for ‘direct democracy’ is similarly vague, 
often asking respondents questions such as ‘Are referendums a good way to decide 
important political questions?’ even in cases where samples are drawn from multiple 
countries in which popular vote processes take on different forms (Bowler, Donovan, 
and Karp 2007, 355). A more nuanced understanding of public support can be found in 
Dyck and Baldassare (2009), who focus on a specific popular vote process – the 
9 In the case of Switzerland, Vatter and Danaci (2010; see also Moeckli 2011, 779) however 
show that not all minorities are equally impacted. Those whose rights are the most 
endangered are minorities perceived as out-groups.



































































initiative process in California – and ask questions about institutional details and 
possible reforms.
This tendency is also visible in problematic generalisations from single popular 
votes to all of the various existing procedures. While both California’s Proposition 13 
and Brexit referendums are invoked by those who oppose direct democracy (Achen and 
Bartels 2016, 81–85; Offe 2017, 17; Shapiro 2017, 82; McCarthy 2017, 34–35), too 
little is said about whether it is popular vote processes themselves or their particular 
institutional forms that are to blame for their democratic shortcomings (Daly 2015, 31; 
Hollander 2019, 7). Moreover, these cases provide little information about the 
democratic value of other popular vote processes, like facultative referendums, that 
might be maligned by critics due to their alleged association with direct democracy (el-
Wakil 2017). Finally, by focusing only on single instances of popular vote processes, 
researchers fail to account not only for the effects of popular vote mechanisms on 
democratic systems in the long term, but also for failed attempts to organise such 
popular votes. The DDA and its homogenising conception of popular vote processes 
exacerbates these problems, as it encourages papering over the multiple differences in 
institutional designs for popular votes (e.g., Offe 2017, 17).10
Conclusion: Towards the DSA
By explicitly engaging with the underlying normative and conceptual assumptions of 
existing studies of popular vote processes, we have argued that there are good reasons to 
disentangle these processes from the notion of direct democracy, understood as 
10 Sometimes in full knowledge of the fact that they are ignoring these differences: Miller (2014, 
437 fn2) for instance notes that he will not name the Swiss popular vote on the minarets’ ban 
an initiative (the appropriate name for this popular vote procedure), but a referendum ‘as the 
term commonly used to describe popular votes of this kind’.



































































unmediated, non-representative politics. The DDA limits the success of discussions 
about popular vote processes and their democratic potential in the following ways: it 
proposes an untenable notion of direct democracy as normative framework, which 
makes all processes attached to it easily dismissed; it prevents researchers from seeing 
similarities between processes categorised as ‘direct’ and processes categorised as 
‘representative’; and it entails a homogeneous conception of popular vote processes. 
We have suggested that the DSA provides students of popular vote processes 
with an alternative approach to answering the question of what place popular vote 
processes can and should have in democratic systems. It leaves aside interminable 
debates about models of democracy to highlight the commonalities between popular 
vote processes and other democratic institutions while acknowledging the institutional 
variation within the former. However, we have also shown that the DDA is both 
pervasive and persistent in ways that can undermine attempts to approach popular vote 
processes from a different perspective. Even what we take above as instances of the 
DSA sometimes fall back on the DDA’s shortcomings. For instance, it is not uncommon 
to find claims about “referendums” in general based on findings or considerations about 
only popular initiatives (see e.g., Gastil and Richards 2013, 255; Leemann 2015, 613). 
While making the DSA more explicit should help address this problem, we propose two 
practical recommendations for those who wish to move past the DDA.
A first recommendation is to explicitly approach popular vote processes as 
political processes that are not a priori hostile to, or subordinate to, representative 
institutions, and thus with similar normative and theoretical tools as other political 
processes. Such a process has already happened to popular assemblies. While they 
remain sometimes attached to the notion of ‘direct democracy’ (see e.g., Gastil and 
Richards 2013, 255; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001), there is widespread agreement 



































































that models of democracy are inadequate as a way of approaching these institutions (de 
Sousa Santos 1998, 487; Novy and Leubolt 2005, 2027; Baiocchi and Ganuza 2014, 
33). We argue that popular vote processes should similarly be disentangled from the 
model of direct democracy, and reconceptualized as simply one sort of institutional 
arrangement among the different procedures for citizens’ participation, such as 
elections, town hall meetings, mini-publics, and others. This reconceptualization makes 
it possible to draw on theories and insights from the study of other democratic 
institutions in order to better understand popular vote processes and the role that they 
can play in democratic systems (see e.g., Setälä 2006; Lang and Warren 2012; 
Grynaviski 2015) – but also to use theories and insights about popular vote processes to 
study other processes (see Setälä 2011).
A second recommendation is to change the way in which we talk about 
initiatives and referendums in order to highlight the importance of institutional 
variation. Scholars who acknowledge the differences between types of popular vote 
processes or point to the importance of moving past models of democracy should stop 
framing their findings in terms of ‘direct democracy’ (see e.g., Bauer and Fatke 2014; 
Peters 2016; Marien and Kern 2018). While the term ‘referendums’ extricates popular 
vote processes from the shadow of direct democracy and acknowledges that they are 
simply one sort of institutional arrangement that might be put toward democratic ends 
and points to their substantive difference, namely that voters choose primarily between 
policies rather than candidates (see e.g., Uleri 1996; Altman 2015, 3; Lacey 2017, 24), 
using ‘referendums’ as a general category that includes specific initiative and 
referendum processes carries the risk of continuing to make overgeneralised claims 
about popular vote processes. The term ‘popular vote processes’ similarly disentangles 
debates about direct democracy from debates about specific institutional designs and 



































































does away with confusions resulting from the fact that, while popular votes can be 
democratic, they can fail basic democratic norms and can be deployed for non-
democratic ends (Walker 2003; Altman 2011, 88–109; Qvortrup 2017; Topaloff 2017). 
However, unlike ‘referendums’, it better accounts for the variation in the 
implementation of referendum and initiative processes as it makes it possible to 
distinguish the general family of procedures that culminate in votes on policies from 
specific referendum procedures, such as facultative or mandatory referendums. Finally, 
it recognises that the popular vote is not the only relevant part of these institutions. 
These processes empower different actors depending on the way in which they can be 
triggered – whether through the collection of signatures or governmental decision; they 
launch different kinds of discourse depending on popular vote campaign regulations; 
they induce different post-vote chains of events depending on the binding character of 
the vote (for more dimensions of variation, see el-Wakil and Cheneval 2018); and they 
distribute empowerments even when no popular vote takes place, for instance because 
petitioners failed to collect enough signatures or courts challenged top-down 
referendum projects. 
Undertaking these and further steps towards adopting the DSA makes it possible 
to get beyond biased questionings about direct democracy to find new relevant research 
puzzles: what kinds of popular vote processes can best realise which democratic 
functions? What role can popular vote processes play in a democratic division of 
labour? When are representative relationships strengthened by popular vote processes? 
What innovative coupling can help making popular vote processes contribute to 
democratic functions? We cannot answer these questions here. But we hope to have 
shown that the DSA provides a sound, coherent and appealing basis for addressing them 
in normative and empirical research.



































































While our argument has focused on approaches to popular vote processes in 
scholarly research, we believe that public conversations would also benefit from a shift 
away from the DDA.11 The DDA can serve the interests of strategically-minded 
political entrepreneurs who might manipulate the procedures of popular vote processes 
in an attempt to bring about their desired outcomes. Claims that these processes are 
‘direct democratic’ hides such manipulation attempts by suggesting that representatives’ 
role is minimized and pre-judges the democratic character of these processes. While 
both right-wing populist parties (Müller 2016, 29) and progressive movements, parties, 
think tanks, or elected officials (Scarrow 2001, 652–53) have called for ‘more direct 
democracy,’ the DDA also conceals that these actors propose different processes for 
very different reasons. For instance, while populist political parties like UKIP may 
endorse top-down referendums as ways of circumventing allegedly corrupt politicians, 
movements like the Yellow Vests advocate for the adoption of bottom-up referendums 
as a way of also allowing citizens to set the agenda for a popular vote. The general 
slogan of direct democracy hides this diversity, and the necessity to distinguish better 
from worse implementations of popular vote processes and better from worse reasons to 
adopt or reject them. It may also generate expectations that are unlikely to be met: 
recent research shows that, while citizens support popular vote processes in theory, they 
are frequently disappointed in practice (Bowler and Donovan 2019). Moving towards 
acknowledging the practice and diversity of popular vote processes might generate, for 
both researchers and political actors, more appropriate expectations regarding what 
these processes can and cannot achieve in democratic systems. 
11 We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the importance of this point. 
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